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EMPLOYER MONITORING OF EMPLOYEE
EMAIL: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
SHOULD ATTACH TO COMMUNICATIONS THAT
THE CLIENT BELIEVED WERE CONFIDENTIAL
Alex DeLisi*
Emails feel like private, confidential communications. But in the
workplace, employers often retain the right to monitor every
communication sent or received by an employee on an employer-owned
device or network. This Note addresses the issue of whether attorney-client
privilege should attach to communications made between an employee and
her private attorney over a system monitored by her employer. When
addressing this issue, most district and state courts apply a test that seeks to
determine the reasonableness of the employee’s expectation of
confidentiality in the attorney-client communication. However, courts
differ in how they apply the expectation of reasonableness test, with nearly
every court finding a different fact dispositive. This Note argues that
attorneys, employers, and courts should instead use a three-pronged
approach:
first, attorneys should seek to prevent monitored
communications with their clients from occurring in the first place; second,
employers should take precautions to prevent their employees’ attorneyclient communications from becoming nonconfidential; and third, courts
should allow attorney-client privilege to attach to communications that the
client believed were confidential.
This three-pronged approach is
consistent with the doctrine’s other exceptions to a strict confidentiality
requirement and realigns attorney-client privilege with its public policy
goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Emails feel like private conversations. At work, however, employers’
internet monitoring policies render personal emails nonprivate.1 Many
employer policies reserve the right to monitor every single email sent or
received by employees.2 A recent New York Times analysis concluded that
“no matter what you are trying to hide in your email in-box . . . it is possible
that someone will find out.”3 This creates a tension between an employee’s
expectation of privacy in his or her work computer files and emails, and the
lack of actual privacy.4
In 2003, employees of Asia Global Crossing (AGC), a pan-Asian
telecommunications carrier, sent personal emails over AGC’s company
system to their personal counsel.5 AGC filed for bankruptcy protection and
the appointed bankruptcy trustee began investigating certain transactions
involving the employees.6 The trustee brought a motion to compel
production of the employees’ emails, but the employees resisted on the
grounds that the emails were protected by attorney-client privilege.7
Drawing on Fourth Amendment case law concerning expectations of
privacy, Chief Bankruptcy Judge Stuart Bernstein of the Southern District
of New York established a four-factor test that has since become the “most
oft-quoted” test8 for determining whether an employee’s use of a
company’s email system destroys the attorney-client privilege:
(1) Does the employer have a policy banning employees’ personal use of
computers; (2) Does the employer monitor employees’ computer use;
(3) Do third parties have a right of access to employees’ computers and
emails; and (4) Were the employees notified or aware of the employer’s
use and monitoring policy.9

In the case of AGC’s employees, Judge Bernstein held that because
attorney-client privilege would have otherwise attached to their

1. See Matt Villano, The Workplace: Your Company Monitors Your Personal Email,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/business/worldbusiness/
05iht-workcol06.4803648.html.
2. See id.
3. See Nicole Perlroth, Trying To Keep Your E-mails Secret When the C.I.A. Chief
Couldn’t, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at B1.
4. See In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1224 (D. Or. 2009) (discussing “a
fundamental misunderstanding of the lack of privacy we all have in our e-mails. Some
people seem to think that they are as private as letters, phone calls, or journal entries. The
blunt fact is, they are not.”).
5. See In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 252 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
6. See id. at 252–53.
7. See id.
8. Goldstein v. Colborne Acquisition Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d 932, 935 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
9. Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *3 (S.D. W. Va.
Oct. 31, 2011) (summarizing Asia Global Crossing’s four-factor test).
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communications, the employees’ use of the company’s email system,
without more, did not destroy the privilege.10
This Note analyzes the circumstances that should be required for
attorney-client privilege to attach to electronic communications that are
monitored by employers. It argues for a three-pronged approach. First,
lawyers should seek to prevent nonconfidential communications from
occurring by discussing the degree of confidentiality of their client’s
workplace systems and how the lack of confidentiality might undermine
attorney-client privilege. Second, if employers monitor attorney-client
communications, employers should attempt to avoid reading them so that,
even though they were technically nonconfidential, courts may still
consider them privileged. Third, courts should allow the privilege to attach
when the employee believed that her communications with her attorney
were confidential. The third prong represents a new exception to the
confidentiality requirement of attorney-client privilege doctrine; when an
employer monitors an employee’s electronic communications with her
lawyer, the employee’s belief that the communication was confidential
should dictate whether the privilege attaches.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I offers an overview of attorneyclient privilege, including a history of the privilege and an examination of
how the privilege functions when a third party, such as an employer,
monitors attorney-client communications. Part II explores the approaches
that courts use and that commentators have proposed to determine when the
privilege attaches to employer-monitored attorney-client communications.
Part III argues that the public policy of promoting client candor in attorneyclient communications necessitates a three-pronged approach, including the
allowance of a new exception to the confidentiality requirement when the
client believed that a monitored communication was confidential.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND EMPLOYER MONITORING
This part discusses attorney-client privilege in four subparts: Part I.A
offers an overview of attorney-client privilege. Next, Part I.B traces the
history of the confidentiality requirement as it evolved to stay consistent
with the privilege’s public policy goals. Part I.C then examines employer
monitoring of employee communications and the impact such monitoring
has on the confidentiality of employee communications. Lastly, Part I.D
summarizes past scholarship arguing that lawyers or employers should
prevent monitored attorney-client communications from occurring.
A. Overview of Attorney-Client Privilege
This subpart first considers the history of attorney-client privilege before
outlining the four elements of the modern privilege.

10. See Asia Global Crossing, 322 B.R. at 265.
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1. History of Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege first arose in the sixteenth century and is the
oldest of the common law privileges.11 Initially the privilege protected an
attorney from testifying against his client, as that was thought to be
“dishonorable and ungentlemanly.”12 In the eighteenth century, the purpose
of the privilege evolved to protect the client instead of the attorney, by
incorporating the understanding that the nature of the attorney-client
relationship required security for the client.13
American courts adopted the privilege from English common law, and
the U.S. Supreme Court first formally recognized the privilege in 1826.14
In England, only attorney-client communications made in anticipation of or
during a dispute were protected by the privilege.15 Unlike English common
law, early case law in the United States did not require that communications
were made in anticipation of litigation.16
The modern understanding of the privilege is that it facilitates the client’s
complete disclosure, which allows the attorney to give accurate and useful
legal advice.17 The Supreme Court has held that attorney-client privilege
promotes “public interests in the observance of law and the administration
of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”18
2. Nature of the Privilege: Four Elements
The mere fact that a client communicates with an attorney does not
necessarily make the communication privileged.19 Courts generally follow
11. See Klitzman v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1984); see also 1 PAUL R. RICE,
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:2 (1999).
12. RONALD GOLDFARB, IN CONFIDENCE: WHEN TO PROTECT SECRECY AND WHEN TO
REQUIRE DISCLOSURE 60 (2009).
13. See id.; see also Pearse v. Pearse, (1846) 63 Eng. Rep. 950 (H.L.) 957 (“Truth, like
all other good things may be loved unwisely—maybe pursued too keenly—may cost too
much. And surely the meanness and mischief of prying into a man’s confidential
consultations with his legal adviser, the general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation,
uneasiness, and suspicion and fear, into the communications which must take place, and
which, unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place uselessly or worse, are too
great a price to pay for truth itself.”); 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 1:3.
14. See Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826); see also 1 RICE, supra
note 11, § 1:1.
15. See Minet v. Morgan, L.R. 8 Ch. App. 361, 363 (1873).
16. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 1:12 (outlining the twenty reported cases in the United
States prior to 1820, all of which “show no evidence of the pending or in anticipation of
litigation limitation on the privilege” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17. See, e.g., Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *5 (S.D.
W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011).
18. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
19. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 2:1; see also United States v. Constanzo, 625 F.2d 465,
468 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[A] communication is not privileged simply because it is made by or to
a person who happens to be a lawyer.” (quoting Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977))).
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a variation of Professor Wigmore’s eight requirements for a communication
to be privileged:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.20

More recent recitations of the attorney-client privilege doctrine reduce its
elements to four requirements: (1) a communication (2) made between
privileged parties (3) intended to be kept confidential and was kept
confidential, (4) that was made for the purpose of obtaining or providing
legal advice.21 The following four sections address each element in turn.
a. Requirement One: A Communication
The attorney and her client must communicate for the privilege to
attach.22 The communication may be oral or written23 and protects the
communication, not the underlying information communicated.24 In other
words, a client cannot turn nonprivileged information into privileged
information by simply communicating the matter to an attorney.25

20. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000) (listing
the four elements of attorney-client privilege as “(1) a communication (2) made between
privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
assistance”); see also In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007) (listing three
elements for the privilege).
22. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 2:1; see also 1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 66 (5th ed. 2007).
23. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 66. The mode of communication does not directly
affect whether the privilege applies. See Davenport v. Ind. Masonic Home Found., Inc., No.
IP 00-1047-CH/G, 2003 WL 1888986, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2003) (upholding the
privilege for a tape recording); Lintz v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., No. Civ.A. 98-2213-JWL, 1999
WL 450197, at *4 (D. Kan. June 24, 1999) (upholding the privilege for a message the client
had written on a fax cover sheet). As discussed infra in Part I.B., the mode of
communication can affect whether the privilege applies insofar as the mode could diminish
the communication’s confidentiality.
24. See, e.g., United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 n.3 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he
privilege attaches not to the information but to the communication of the information.”
(citation omitted)); Lynch v. Novant Med. Grp., Inc., No. 3:08cv340, 2009 WL 2915039, at
*6 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2009) (“[I]t is the Plaintiff’s position that any information that she
possesses regarding her case is protected by the attorney-client privilege as she is acting as
her own attorney in this matter. This argument is frivolous and has no support in the law.
The attorney-client privilege protects only confidential communications between a party and
her attorney.” (internal citation omitted)).
25. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (“[The client] may
not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated
a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.” (citation omitted)).
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b. Requirement Two: Made Between Privileged Persons
The attorney-client privilege applies only to communications between
privileged persons.26 The privilege applies to communications made by
attorneys and clients, as well as to agents of either party.27 For example, if
an attorney retains a consulting firm to assist in representation, the privilege
protects the firm’s communications with the attorney or client that contain
the client’s confidential information.28 Moreover, the communication’s
privileged status is not necessarily lost because the client has communicated
the same facts to another party.29
c. Requirement Three: Intended To Be, Reasonably Believed To Be,
and in Fact Is, Kept Confidential
A client must intend and reasonably believe that her communication will
be confidential at the time the communication is made, and the
communication must remain confidential for the privilege to apply.30
Courts determine the reasonableness of the client’s belief that her
communications are confidential from the circumstances surrounding the
communication—specifically, whether the communications occurred in the
presence of a third party.31 The factual circumstances dictate whether the
communication is in the presence of third parties, thereby rendering it
26. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 134; 1 RICE, supra note 11, §§ 2:1, 2:5, 5:5.
27. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 134; 1 RICE, supra note 11, §§ 2:1, 2:5, 5:5.
28. See, e.g., Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98Civ.8520(BSJ)(MHD),
1999 WL 1006312, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999) (“The communication by counsel to [the
client] seeks assistance by the consultant in preparing a document that consists
predominantly of legal advice rendered by the attorney to her client. As such it is covered by
the privilege.”); Att’y Gen. v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (D.D.C. 1977)
(“[T]he Court has granted the privilege to communications from [the accountants] only to
the extent that disclosure would tend to reveal a confidence from the actual client to one of
them or to the attorney.”).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[T]he privileged
communication and the facts recounted within it are two different things. Thus, a client does
not normally lose the privilege as to communications with his attorney merely because he
testifies at trial to the same events discussed with his lawyer.” (citation omitted)); High Tech
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Panasonic Co., Civ. A. No. 94-1477, 1995 WL 45847, at *5 (E.D. La.
Feb. 2, 1995) (“[A] party who merely discloses the facts contained in a privileged
communication has not placed the communication at issue.”).
30. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 (upholding the privilege and emphasizing that the
documents were intended to be and were kept confidential by the client company). See
generally 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 6 (discussing the confidentiality requirement).
31. See United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 133 (2d Cir.) (holding that a prisoner who
knew that his calls were recorded could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy), cert.
denied sub nom. Rodriguez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 533 (2011); United States v.
Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1409 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the attorney-client privilege
did not attach because the communication was revealed to his attorney and to third persons);
United States v. Steele, No. 2:10-cr-000148-BLW, 2011 WL 5403076, at *5 (D. Idaho Nov.
8, 2011) (holding that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in recorded calls);
Comprehensive Habilitation Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Funding Corp., 240 F.R.D. 78, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]here was no privileged communication at which the IRS was
present.”).
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nonconfidential.32 For instance, if a client knows her communications with
her attorney are being recorded, courts have held that there can be no
reasonable expectation of confidentiality.33
The confidentiality requirement goes hand in hand with waiver of the
privilege.34 Though waiver of the privilege may be express or implied,35
waiver by implication is more common and occurs when the client’s
conduct is inconsistent with a claim of confidentiality.36 If a client
communicates with the attorney with a reasonable expectation of privacy,
but then fails to maintain that confidentiality, the client implicitly waives
the privilege.37
In other words, a client waives her attorney-client privilege when she
discloses confidential information to a third party—regardless of whether
the client intentionally waived the privilege.38 However, the client does not
32. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that attorneyclient privilege attached where corporate counsel and attorney were seated next to each other
in first-class on a plane, because there were no other parties to their conversation, they were
talking in low volumes not likely to be overheard, and the conversation itself dealt with legal
analysis).
33. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Hatcher, 323
F.3d 666, 674 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Because the inmates and their lawyers were aware that their
conversations were being recorded, they could not reasonably expect that their conversations
would remain private.”); Cody v. Walter, No. Civ. 08-4024, 2008 WL 4543042, at *8
(D.S.D. Sept. 18, 2008) (“The presence of the recording device was the functional equivalent
of the presence of a third party.”).
34. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (“The
confidentiality element and waiver are closely related inasmuch as any voluntary disclosure
inconsistent with the confidential nature of the attorney client relationship waives the
privilege.”).
35. See In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Implied waiver
nullifies a privilege when disclosure of a privileged communication has vitiated
confidentiality.”).
36. See 2 RICE, supra note 11, § 9:25.
37. See Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2003) (“When [the
municipal body] showed the Mayor a copy of the report, it waived any privilege it
possesses.”); Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
Agency, 827 F. Supp. 2d 242, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Given the extensive and specific
evidence produced by plaintiffs showing that the factual information, legal analysis, and
legal conclusions in the Memorandum have been disclosed to the public, I find that
[Defendant] has failed to meet its burden of proving that confidentiality was maintained.”);
Flo Pac, LLC v. NuTech, LLC, No. WDQ-09-510, 2010 WL 5125447, at *7 (D. Md. Dec. 9,
2010) (noting that “waiver occurs when a privileged communication is disclosed to a third
party at a later date”).
38. See, e.g., Bowne of N.Y.C., Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (“[T]he intent of the party and its attorney not to cause an implied waiver is
immaterial if they intentionally undertake actions that have the effect of causing such a
waiver.”); United States v. Betinsky, No. 88-198, 1988 WL 97673, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20,
1988) (“Subjective intent is irrelevant if the ‘person fails to take affirmative action and
institute reasonable precautions’ to protect confidentiality.” (quoting Parkway Gallery
Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Grp., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50 (M.D.N.C. 1987)), aff’d,
877 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1989); Goldman Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286, 288 (N.D.
Ill. 1976) (“[I]t is a uniform rule that when a party’s conduct reaches a certain point of
disclosure, fairness requires that the privilege cease, whether or not this is the result
intended.”).
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waive the privilege if: “(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of
the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error.”39
In order to determine whether the client took adequate precautions to
preserve the confidentiality of the attorney-client communications, courts
consider the effect and feasibility of preventing disclosure, such as the
standard stated in Suburban Sew ’N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc.:
In determining whether the precautions taken were adequate, two
considerations are paramount: (1) the effect on uninhibited consultation
between attorney and client of not allowing the privilege in these
circumstances; and (2) the ability of the parties to the communication to
protect against the disclosures.40

Therefore, when a client leaves documents in a place accessible to third
parties without taking measures to maintain their confidentiality,41 or when
a client leaves papers in a public hallway42 or a table in a hotel room
occupied by other people,43 the client has implicitly waived the privilege
because the client failed to take available precautions to retain the
confidentiality of the written communications.
Involuntary disclosures will not result in a waiver, however, if the
responsibility of losing confidentiality lies with someone other than the
client—such as when documents have been stolen.44 In the criminal
context, involuntary disclosure of attorney-client communications via
illegal search or seizure does not affect the defendant’s privilege protection,
unless the defendant is aware that the communications have been seized.45
Once the client knows that the privileged communications have been
seized, courts will place the responsibility back with the client to take all
reasonable measures to retrieve the communications to retain the
privilege.46
39. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
40. Suburban Sew ’N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
41. See generally In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973) (where client had left
documents in accountant’s office).
42. See In re Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
43. See Bower v. Weisman, 669 F. Supp. 602, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
44. See, e.g., Sackman v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 358, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The
assertion of privilege . . . is not waived through public disclosure of a stolen privileged
document.”); see also Suburban Sew ’N Sweep, Inc., 91 F.R.D. at 260 (“[R]eview of the
cases, and particularly of the evolving rule with respect to eavesdroppers, reveals that the
privilege is not simply inapplicable any time that confidentiality is breached, as plaintiffs
claim, and that the relevant consideration is the intent of the defendants to maintain the
confidentiality of the documents as manifested in the precautions they took.”).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1515–16 (11th Cir. 1987); Bishop
v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1156–57 (6th Cir. 1983).
46. Compare In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3d 978, 983 (3d Cir. 1998) (client
did not seek judicial intervention to protect adversary from possessing privileged
communication, and the privilege protection was lost), and United States v. De La Jara, 973
F.2d 746, 749–50, (9th Cir. 1992) (privilege was waived because the client did not seek
judicial intervention to stop the prosecution’s use of the privileged communication), with
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To determine whether the communication remained confidential in fact,
courts consider not only if the communication was made available to third
parties but also whether the communications were conducted or created to
inform a third party.47 Courts must determine whether the client intended
to relinquish the confidentiality of the communication, which has the effect
of either making the expectation of confidentiality unreasonable or making
the communication nonconfidential.48
d. Requirement Four: Made for the Purpose of Obtaining Legal Advice
The fourth and final element of attorney-client privilege is that a client’s
confidential communication to his attorney must be “necessary to obtain
informed legal advice.”49 Courts do not require an express request for legal
advice.50 While courts consider the lawyer’s role to determine whether a
communication is comprised of legal advice,51 ultimately the client’s
intention to obtain legal advice or assistance controls.52
United States v. Western Titanium, Inc., No. 08-CR-4229-JLS, 2010 WL 3789775, at *6
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010) (client took actions to retrieve the privileged documents from the
prosecution and consequently the privilege was not waived).
47. See United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983) (“When information is transmitted to an attorney
with the intent that the information will be transmitted to a third party . . . such information
is not confidential.”); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 1982);
United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1963) (“Only matters transmitted by
the client that are intended to be confidential communications to his attorney are
protected.”).
48. For example, courts have found no expectation of confidentiality when the attorneyclient communication is prepared for public filings or other publicly published materials. See
United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that information disclosed
for the purpose of assembly into a bankruptcy petition does not have an expectation of
confidentiality); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1073 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[A]ppellants
not only obtained the tax law opinions for the ultimate use of persons other than themselves,
but also publicized portions of the legal opinions in brochures and other printed material.”).
49. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
50. See, e.g., First Heights Bank, FSB v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 312, 315 (2000)
(“[I]t is not necessary that the party invoking the privilege expressly request confidential
legal assistance when that request is implied.”).
51. See Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 884 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that the privilege did not apply where “counsel ceased to function as lawyers and
began to function as regulators. Therefore, [the defendant] could not invoke the attorneyclient privilege in connection with the documents at issue.”); SEC v. Credit Bancorp., Ltd.,
51 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1429, 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding the privilege did not apply
“because the reports, although prepared by attorneys, are prepared as part of the regular
business of the company” (internal quotation omitted)); EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 339–40.
52. See United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that the
district court erred in concluding that the work file was protected by the attorney-client
privilege because it was not made for the purpose of providing legal advice); United States v.
Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding communications not privileged
because “[t]he defendant does not point us to . . . any credible evidence in the record that
demonstrates that the conversations related to legal advice or strategy sought”); Favors v.
Cuomo, 285 F.R.D. 187, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that in order for the privilege to
apply, “the predominant purpose of the communication must be to render or solicit legal
advice” (internal quotations omitted)).
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Whether articulated as eight53 or four elements,54 the proponent of the
privilege must “demonstrate its applicability”;55 if successful, the privilege
prevents the disclosure of the substance of the communications, continuing
beyond the death of the client so long as confidentiality is preserved.56 The
protection is absolute in that it “cannot be overcome simply by a showing of
need.”57 In other words, the privilege applies regardless of the adversary’s
or the court’s need for the information contained in the communications.58
While this may seem like a loss from a truth-seeking standpoint,59 some
commentators have argued that the communications do not really represent
a “loss” of evidence because the client would not have made the
communications without the shield of attorney-client privilege.60
B. The Confidentiality Requirement’s Evolution
This subpart focuses on the confidentiality requirement—first, how it
evolved to incorporate exceptions that allow the attorney-client privilege to
retain the goal of promoting client candor; and second, how scholars debate
confidentiality’s usefulness as a requirement for the privilege to attach.
The attorney-client privilege evolved over time and the requirement of
confidentiality has evolved with it.61 Beginning in the early nineteenth
century, courts began denying the privilege when the communication
occurred in the presence of third parties.62 Paul Rice, the author of the

53. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
55. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 341 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2003); see also In re Mentor
Corp. ObTape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1380 (M.D.
Ga. 2009) (“Defendant, however, still bears the burden of establishing that the privileged
documents have remained confidential.”).
56. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, §§ 2:1, 2:2, 2:5.
57. Martin v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 140 F.R.D. 291, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also
Bank Hapoalim, B.M. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 92 Civ. 3561 (KMW), 1993 WL
37506, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1993) (“The attorney-client privilege is an absolute
privilege.”).
58. See, e.g., Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 522 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (“The importance of this principle is underscored by the fact that this privilege, unlike
most others, is absolute in the sense that it cannot be overcome merely by a showing that the
information would be extremely helpful to the party seeking disclosure.”).
59. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (discussing the balance
between the search for truth and the need to protect work product or privileged
communications).
60. 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 2:3; see Developments in the Law: Privileged
Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1508 (1985).
61. See supra Part I.A.1.
62. See, e.g., Basye v. State, 63 N.W. 811, 818 (Neb. 1895) (“Where, at least in the
absence of fraud and collusion, a client makes statements to his attorney in the presence of a
third party, such person is not prohibited by statute from testifying to such statement.”);
People v. Buchanan, 39 N.E. 846, 854 (N.Y. 1895) (“A communication intended to be
confidential should not be made in the hearing of a third person, unless that person stood in a
peculiar relation of confidence . . . . The protection extended by the statute to
communications between attorney and client is intended to cover those which the relation
calls for, and are supposed to be confided to the lawyer to guide him in giving his
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“leading treatise”63 on attorney-client privilege, has argued that the
confidentiality requirement should be abolished in a return to the early
conception of the privilege.64 Other commentators have rejected Professor
Rice’s proposal and insist that confidentiality is an essential requirement of
attorney-client privilege.65 This subpart first analyzes how exceptions to
the confidentiality requirement emerged over time to allow the privilege to
continue to serve its public policy purpose of promoting client candor.
Second, the subpart addresses arguments for retaining confidentiality as a
requirement for attorney-client privilege, before considering Professor
Rice’s position that the confidentiality requirement be abolished.
1. Three Exceptions to the Confidentiality Requirement and
How They Promote Client Candor
Though
attorney-client
privilege
generally
requires
strict
confidentiality,66 the public policy goals of promoting client candor and
effective representation create circumstances where disclosures to third
parties do not destroy the privilege.67 There are three broad categories of
exceptions to the confidentiality requirement: agents of the attorney or
client, joint clients, and inadvertent disclosures.68 Each exception is
addressed below in light of how each promotes the public policy goals of
encouraging client candor and effective representation.69
The first exception to the confidentiality requirement is third-party
agents. Disclosure to agents of the client or attorney who assist in the
client’s legal representation does not destroy the privilege.70 Agents of
attorneys can be either ministerial agents71 or substantive experts who assist

professional aid and advice. I am not aware of any extension of the rule which would protect
the revelation of confidences made to a friend, or to a lawyer in the presence of a friend.”).
63. Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 31, 32 (referring to RICE, supra note 11).
64. See generally Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of
Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853 (1998) (arguing that confidentiality
is an illogical requirement for attorney-client privilege).
65. See Leslie, supra note 63, at 33; see also 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW
WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.8 (2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2013).
66. See supra Part I.A.2.c.
67. See 2 RICE, supra note 11, § 9:68.
68. See 1 id. §§ 3:3, 4:2, 4:31; 2 id. § 9:72.
69. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
70. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, §§ 3:3, 4:2; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 258.
71. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1046–47
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (“Given the complexities of modern existence few, if any, lawyers could as
a practical matter represent the interests of their clients without the assistance of a variety of
trained legal associates not yet admitted to the bar, clerks, typists, messengers, and similar
aides. ‘The assistance of these agents being indispensable to his work and the
communications of the client being often necessarily committed to them by the attorney or
by the client himself, the privilege must include all the persons who act as the attorney’s
agents.’” (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2301, at 583)), aff’d sub nom., Edney v.
Smith, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977).
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the attorney in representation.72 To qualify as an agent, the relationship
must meet the fundamental requirements of agency.73 Attorney-client
privilege may attach to a communication made between the agent and the
attorney or client, or to a communication made between the attorney or
client in the presence of an agent.74 By expanding the circle of
confidentiality beyond the client and the attorney, courts promote the public
policy goal of encouraging effective legal representation; without such an
exception for agents, it would be difficult or “occasionally impossible” for a
single attorney to render adequate legal representation.75 In other words, an
expanded concept of confidentiality that encompasses agents of the attorney
and client allows a client to communicate candidly with her entire legal
representation team; otherwise, the attorney would be forced to personally
perform all acts of the representation, curtailing the effectiveness of the
representation.76 Because attorneys often need agents to assist in
representation, clients must trust that their communications with the agents
remain privileged, and thus the privilege continues to promote its goal of
encouraging client candor.77
The second exception to the confidentiality requirement is when multiple
clients share a common interest and are represented by the same attorney
simultaneously.78 Courts have designated this joint client scenario as an
“exception”79 or an “extension”80 of the confidentiality requirement.
72. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (“We cannot regard the
privilege as confined to ‘menial or ministerial’ employees. Thus, we can see no significant
difference between a case where the attorney sends a client speaking a foreign language to
an interpreter to make a literal translation of the client’s story . . . .”); United States v.
Singhal, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege may be
preserved even when confidential communications are disclosed to a third party—such as an
investment banker—as long as the third party is serving an ‘interpretive function’ to aid the
lawyer in helping the client.”).
73. See Henderson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502, 509 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(reciting the three requirements of agency as the power to affect legal relations, a fiduciary
relationship, and the principle’s right to the control the agent’s conduct).
74. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 3:3.
75. See id.
76. See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922 (“[T]here can be no more virtue in requiring the lawyer
to sit by while the client pursues these possibly tedious preliminary conversations with the
accountant than in insisting on the lawyer’s physical presence while the client dictates a
statement to the lawyer’s secretary or is interviewed by a clerk not yet admitted to
practice.”).
77. See id. at 923 (finding that the need to determine where the agency line is drawn is
necessary “if the privilege is neither to be unduly expanded nor to become a trap”).
78. See Hanson v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“Described as an extension of the attorney client privilege, the common interest doctrine
applies when two or more parties consult or retain an attorney concerning a legal matter in
which they share a common interest.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. See Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 250 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The commoninterest doctrine, like the rule announced in Kovel, is not an independent basis for privilege,
but an exception to the general rule that the attorney-client privilege is waived when
privileged information is disclosed to a third party.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the
joint defense privilege is an extension of the attorney-client privilege); Griffith v. Davis, 161
F.R.D. 687, 691 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (same).
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Similar to the exception for agents, courts began allowing an exception for
joint clients because the exception keeps the privilege in line with its public
policy goal of promoting client candor.81 Individuals with shared legal
interests can pool information and make disclosures in the presence of their
co-clients that they would not have made but for the sake of securing
effective legal representation.82
A third exception to the privilege’s confidentiality requirement is when a
client involuntarily discloses the communication to a third party.83 When a
disclosure is inadvertent, courts are reluctant to allow a strict confidentiality
requirement to trump the public policy of encouraging open
communications between clients and attorneys.84 Courts consider factspecific circumstances such as the precautions the parties took to prevent
disclosure, the volume of discovery, the time pressure of discovery, the
extent of the disclosures, the time to rectify the disclosures, and overriding
issues of fairness.85 However, courts “overwhelmingly recognize[]” the
privilege when the disclosure was inadvertent.86 These courts seek to avoid
instilling fear in clients that a mistaken disclosure will mean admissibility,
because that may chill future attorney-client communications.87
In sum, the justification for allowing confidentiality to include third-party
agents, joint defense clients, and involuntary disclosures is the same as the
goals of attorney-client privilege itself: promoting client candor and
effective representation.88 The confidentiality requirement, like the
privilege itself, has developed pragmatically in response to attempts to find

81. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 4:30; supra note 18 and accompanying text.
82. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 16, 1974, 406 F.
Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“[I]t may reasonably be inferred that resultant disclosures
are intended to be insulated from exposure beyond the confines of the group; that inference,
supported by a demonstration that the disclosures would not have been made but for the sake
of securing, advancing, or supplying legal representation, will give sufficient force to a
subsequent claim to the privilege.”). In addition to the public policy goal of promoting client
candor and effective legal advice, the joint defense exception to confidentiality serves an
additional policy goal of saving attorneys’ and courts’ resources by expediting the trial
preparation process. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1337 (7th Cir. 1979)
(“Cooperation between defendants in such circumstances is often not only in their own best
interests but serves to expedite the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial preparation.”).
83. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. Rule 502(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence codifies the inadvertent disclosure exception that courts recognized at common
law:
When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the disclosure
does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if: (1) the disclosure
is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to
prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the
error.
FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
84. See 2 RICE, supra note 11, § 9.79.
85. See id. § 9.73.
86. Paul R. Rice, A Bad Idea Dying Hard: A Reply to Professor Leslie’s Defense of the
Indefensible, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 187, 196.
87. See 2 RICE, supra note 11, § 9.73.
88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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a balance between truth-seeking and promoting client candor.89 In part
because courts have curtailed the rigidity of the confidentiality requirement
with these exceptions, certain scholars debate whether confidentiality is a
“logical imperative” of the privilege at all.90 The following subparts
explore the two sides of this debate.
2. Arguments for Confidentiality As a Requirement
for the Privilege To Attach
When Professor Wigmore first developed the confidentiality requirement
around the turn of the nineteenth century,91 his theory was that there would
be no need to provide the incentive of the privilege if the client is otherwise
willing to let others know what he has told the lawyer.92 More recent
proponents of the confidentiality requirement advance two additional
arguments: first, that confidentiality serves as a useful limitation on the
scope of the privilege, and second, that requiring confidentiality reduces
litigation costs.
The primary justification for confidentiality—that confidentiality serves
as a limitation to ensure that it applies only to those statements that would
not have been made without the privilege—is an extension of Professor
Wigmore’s conceptualization of confidentiality93:
The attorney-client privilege does not seek to encourage attorney-client
communication at any price. Rather, scholars and courts adjudicating
privilege issues have long struggled with the tension between the need for
the privilege and the substantial cost of shielding relevant evidence from
the fact finder . . . . The confidentiality requirement . . . seeks to ensure
that the privilege protects only those attorney-client communications that
would not have been made absent the privilege.94

In other words, the requirement of confidentiality serves as a limiting
function that helps to balance the court’s “truth-seeking process” with the
privilege’s goal of encouraging client candor.95 Confidentiality has thus
been characterized as a “useful bright line limitation.”96
As Professor Leslie has argued, a secondary argument for keeping
confidentiality as a requirement for the privilege is that eliminating the
requirement would increase litigation costs.97 First, the confidentiality
89. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 6–8.
90. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 6:4 (“Confidentiality is not the logical imperative it has
been presumed to be.”).
91. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2285, at 531 (“The communications must originate
in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.”); Rice, supra note 64, at 869–70.
92. 24 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5484, at 176, 318, 343 (1986).
93. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 65, § 6.8.
94. Leslie, supra note 63, at 35–36 (emphasis omitted) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note
20, §§ 2292, 2311).
95. See id. at 84.
96. Rice, supra note 86, at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See Leslie, supra note 63, at 77.
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requirement allows courts to rule out the privilege in most cases when a
third party is present, and without that threshold determination, courts
would be forced to expend more resources scrutinizing the content of the
privilege.98 Second, if abolished, the lack of confidentiality requirement
may incentivize clients to hire lawyers to participate in communications in
an attempt to attach privilege claims.99 Third, abolishing the confidentiality
requirement would cause more cases to proceed to trial because the
requirement tends to limit the application of the privilege and increase the
information each party has about the other’s case.100
Taken together, proponents of maintaining the confidentiality
requirement emphasize that it serves as an important limitation on the
privilege101 that saves litigation expenses.102
3. Arguments for Eliminating Confidentiality As a
Requirement for the Privilege
In his treatise on attorney-client privilege, Professor Rice argues that it
has “never been satisfactorily explained” why “the law has linked the
recognition of this privilege to a confidentiality requirement.”103 Rice first
notes that no case prior to the end of the eighteenth century contemplated
confidentiality as a requirement of attorney-client privilege.104 Identifying
confidentiality as a uniquely twentieth century invention,105 Rice has
formulated several arguments for returning to the privilege’s pre–nineteenth
century roots by abolishing confidentiality as a privilege requirement.106
First, Professor Rice argues that confidentiality does not serve the
privilege’s goal of promoting openness between an attorney and client.107
Rice argues that the privilege serves a broader purpose even when the client
has no intention of confidentiality:
if the client does not seek
confidentiality, requiring it does not encourage client candor.108 But if the
client does seek confidentiality while communicating with her attorney, the
attorney can create a confidential condition per the client’s wishes—which
does not necessarily mean that every communication with every client
should require confidentiality to be privileged.109
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 447 (2d Cir. 1958) (“It is of the
essence of the attorney-client privilege that it is limited to those communications which are
intended to be confidential.”).
102. Leslie, supra note 63, at 84.
103. 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 6:1.
104. See id. § 6:3.
105. See PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 196–97 (2004)
(explaining how Professor Wigmore invented the confidentiality requirement).
106. See generally Rice, supra note 64.
107. See id. at 857.
108. See id. at 860.
109. See id. (“The fact that secrecy may be desired is not justification for making it
required.”).
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Second, Professor Rice argues that because the requirement has never
been justified in light of the purpose of the privilege,110 courts have carved
out so many exceptions to the requirement that it is no longer useful or
relevant.111 Due to the exceptions to strict confidentiality,112 Rice argues
that confidentiality has complicated the waiver doctrine and lost its
meaning.113
Professor Rice’s final argument is identical to one of the proponents’
arguments—that abolishing the confidentiality requirement would reduce
litigation costs.114 In support of this cost argument, Rice highlights ways in
which a court’s process for determining confidentiality is “complex.”115
First, for each contested communication, the client must produce evidence
that he intended the communication to be confidential;116 second, the client
must produce evidence that the nature of the relationship of the parties is
covered by the expanded confidentiality doctrine;117 and third, the court
must determine that confidentiality has been maintained.118 Given these
complex and costly evidentiary proceedings, Rice concludes that the cost of
continuing to maintain a confidentiality requirement is not justified given
that the requirement does not serve the purpose of the privilege.119
In sum, certain privilege scholars debate whether confidentiality should
be retained as a requirement for attorney-client privilege to attach to a
communication. The next subpart introduces the types of information that
employers monitor to understand how such monitoring gives rise to a
confidentiality dilemma and therefore an attorney-client privilege problem.
C. Employer Monitoring of Employee Communications
In a time before email, the Supreme Court in O’Connor v. Ortega
considered an employee’s expectation of privacy in the workplace.120 The
O’Connor Court emphasized that the interests of employers to search
workplace property must be balanced against the employee’s right to
privacy in personal items brought to the workplace.121 Despite holding that
the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court noted that
110. See id. at 859 (“Throughout both English and U.S. history, however, not a single
reported decision can be found in which a court has either explicated this reasoning or
questioned its logic.”).
111. Id. at 874–88.
112. See supra Part I.B.1 (categorizing three exceptions to a strict confidentiality
requirement as agents, joint clients, and inadvertent disclosure).
113. See Rice, supra note 86, at 198.
114. See Leslie, supra note 63, at 32–33.
115. See Rice, supra note 64, at 861, 868.
116. Id. at 861–62.
117. Id. at 862.
118. Id. at 863.
119. See id. at 868.
120. 480 U.S. 709, 715–17 (1987) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy when a
doctor’s private office was searched by state officials who seized personal items that were
later used in disciplinary proceedings).
121. See id. at 716.
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“employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets
. . . may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or
by legitimate regulation.”122
Today, courts face a similar question, but instead of a personal item
tucked away in an employer-owned desk, courts grapple with whether an
employee has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in personal emails
given “actual office practices and procedures” of employer monitoring.123
Approximately 92 percent of adult internet users use email, 61 percent of
whom use email on a typical day.124 Now that a majority of employment
settings provide employees with access to email,125 a majority of employees
with internet access spend at least some time during the workday on
nonwork-related online activities.126 The rise in non-work-related online
usage has been accompanied by employers’ monitoring of their employees’
computer use.127 Statistics on the prevalence of employer monitoring tend
to show that 50 to 75 percent of employers monitor electronic
communications transmitted in the workplace.128 Though policies differ in
scope, some employers monitor every single email sent or received by
employees.129
Employers can monitor an employee’s computer usage in several
ways.130 The various monitoring techniques allow employers not only to
monitor all incoming and outgoing messages at home and on webmail but
122. Id. at 717.
123. See id.
124. Kristen Purcell, Search and Email Still Top the List of Most Popular Online
Activities, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 2 (Aug 9, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/
~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Search-and-Email.pdf.
125. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY: COMPUTER USE MONITORING
PRACTICES AND POLICIES OF SELECTED COMPANIES (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.gao
.gov/new.items/d02717.pdf.
126. Websense’s Seventh Annual Web@Work Survey Explores Leading Trends in
Employee Computing for 2006, WEBSENSE (May 17, 2006), http://investor.websense
.com/common/mobile/iphone/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=285092&CompanyID=WBSN&
mobileid= (finding that the average time spent accessing the internet at work is 12.81 hours
per week and the average time accessing nonwork related websites at work is 3.06 hours per
week).
127. L. CAMILLE HEBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 8A:1, at 5 (2006) (“An increasingly
common method of electronic monitoring chosen by employers is monitoring of the work of
employees through computers.”); Kara R. Williams, Protecting What You Thought Was
Yours: Expanding Employee Privacy To Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege from
Employer Computer Monitoring, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 350 (2008) (“Employers’ monitoring
of their employees’ computer use is extremely common in American businesses.”).
128. Am. Mgmt. Ass’n & the e-Pol’y Inst., 2005 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance
Survey, E-POL’Y INST., http://www.epolicyinstitute.com/survey2005Summary.pdf (last
visited Apr. 19, 2013) (reporting that as many as 76 percent of employers monitor their
employees’ computer use); Am. Mgmt. Ass’n, 2003 E-mail Rules Policies, and Practice
Survey, E-POL’Y INST. (May 14, 2003), http://www.epolicyinstitute.com/survey/survey.pdf
(reporting that more than 50 percent of companies monitor employee email).
129. See Villano, supra note 1.
130. See generally Louise L. Hill, Gone but Not Forgotten: When Privacy, Policy and
Privilege Collide, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 565 (2011). The technical aspects of
employer monitoring are outside the scope of this Note.
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can also allow employers to monitor employees’ personal passwords and
unsent messages by recording employees’ keystrokes.131
Employers are legally permitted to monitor employees’ online
communications.132 Employers monitor emails at work for several
reasons133: employers have a right to protect themselves from theft or
misuse of the employers’ resources;134 employers may seek to reduce their
legal liability or ensure legal compliance;135 and in other instances,
employers monitor employee communications to protect their assets and
promote employee productivity.136 Because employers can legally monitor
all communications, this includes communications with private
attorneys.137 Whatever the employer’s reason to justify monitoring, courts
have consistently upheld an employer’s legal right to monitor its
employees’ communications.138
D. Past Scholarship Has Argued That Lawyers or Employers Should
Prevent Monitored Electronic Communications from
Losing Privilege Status
As employer monitoring became more prevalent, scholars started to
consider how lawyers or employers could reduce the likelihood that
131. For an overview of three ways in which employers monitor employees’ email
communications, including keystroke monitoring, see Marc A. Sherman, Webmail at Work:
The Case for Protection Against Employer Monitoring, 23 TOURO L. REV. 647, 661–63
(2007).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 makes it a crime to “intentionally access without authorization a
facility through which an electronic communication service is provided” except when
applied “to conduct authorized . . . by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic
communications service.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006). Because employers provide the
electronic communication service, the exception applies to them.
133. See, e.g, TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 162 (Ct.
App. 2002) (listing reasons companies engage in monitoring practices as including legal
compliance, legal liability, performance review, productivity measures, and security
concerns).
134. HERBERT, supra note 127, § 8A:1, at 5.
135. See Micah Echols, Striking a Balance Between Employer Business Interests and
Employee Privacy: Using Respondeat Superior To Justify the Monitoring of Web-Based,
Personal Electronic Mail Accounts of Employees in the Workplace, 7 COMP. L. REV. &
TECH. J. 273, 278 (2003); see also Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL
5201430, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011) (“First National Bank also needs to be able to
respond to proper requests resulting from legal proceedings that call for electronically stored
evidence.”).
136. Sherman, supra note 131, at 658–60.
137. The use of email among attorneys to communicate with clients is widespread. See
Williams, supra note 127, at 352. Attorneys have endorsed email technology, and the
American Bar Association (ABA) has approved this method of communication as well. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011) (“[A] lawyer
may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent
over the Internet without violating the [Model Rules of Professional Conduct] . . . because
the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a technological
and legal standpoint.”).
138. See, e.g., Hanson, 2011 WL 5201430, at *2 (“First National Bank must, and does,
maintain the right and the ability to enter any of these systems and to inspect and review any
and all data recorded on those systems.”).
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employees communicating with their attorney at work would lose attorneyclient privilege. This section summarizes this line of scholarship.
Since the early days of email, scholars and commentators have warned
that lawyers must be cautious about communicating with their clients over
email because of the risk that the communications are monitored,139 and
therefore may be nonconfidential and nonprivileged.140 Scholars who have
considered attorney-client privilege in the workplace context argue that
lawyers should prevent sensitive, nonprivileged communications from
occurring in the first place or that employers should prevent themselves
from reading otherwise-privileged communications.
Though commentators differ in how far they think a lawyer must go to
prevent potentially nonprivileged communications from occurring; they
argue that, at minimum, a lawyer must take reasonable precautions,141 view
electronic modes of communication with their clients with heightened
scrutiny,142 or not presume email to be secure.143
In 2011, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a Formal Opinion entitled
“Duty to Protect the Confidentiality of E-mail Communications with One’s
Client.”144 The ABA argued that a lawyer choosing to communicate with a
client via electronic means “must warn the client about the risk of sending
or receiving electronic communications . . . to which a third party may gain
access.”145 Because of the ethical ramifications of the risk that the
communications are nonprivileged, the ABA argues that lawyers have a
duty to warn the client to prevent nonprivileged communications from
139. See, e.g., Jonathan Rose, E-mail Security Risks: Taking Hacks at the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 179, 225 (1997) (“[A]ttorneys must address
the significant security threat that accompanies e-mail; otherwise, the confidentiality that
supports the attorney-client privilege may be destroyed.”).
140. See, e.g., John M. Barkett, The Challenge of Electronic Communications: Privilege,
Privacy, and Other Myths, 38 LITIG., Fall 2011, at 17; Anne Klinefelter, When To Research
Is To Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney and Client Confidentiality from Online
Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 22–29 (2011); Megan E. McEnroe, E-mail in AttorneyClient Communications: A Survey of Significant Developments April 2009–June 2010, 66
BUS. LAW. 191, 192–93 (2010); Dion Messer, To: Client@workplace.com: Privilege at
Risk?, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 75, 92–95 (2004); Williams, supra note 137,
at 389–90.
141. Klinefelter, supra note 140, at 30 (noting that in the online tracking context, “courts
should encourage precautions that secure a balance between effectiveness and
manageability, and attorneys should take care to identify and implement reasonable
precautions”); Messer, supra note 140, at 76 (“[A] prudent attorney should consider
implementing some precautionary measures to protect his client from losing the privilege
and confidentiality of e-mail correspondence.”).
142. McEnroe, supra note 140, at 196 (“Recent court decisions, spawned by the
boundless pace of technology, require that lawyers regard the methods and means for client
communication with a heightened sense of scrutiny.”).
143. Barkett, supra note 140, at 19 (“[Lawyers] should never assume that attorney-client
email exchanges from a client’s work computer are secure even when communications occur
through the client’s password-protected personal email account.”).
144. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).
145. Id. at 4.
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occurring in the first place.146 If a client fails to heed the attorney’s caution,
the ABA instructed that the lawyer’s duty requires him or her to cease
sending messages to the client.147 Following an American Law Institute
and ABA Continuing Legal Education program, one participant proposed
sample language that an attorney should incorporate into his or her
representation agreement wherein the client would agree to “NEVER”
communicate via company-owned devices.148
Other commentators have focused not on the lawyers’ duty, but instead
argue that employers should take precautions not to read employees’
communications with their private attorneys after they have been monitored
or recorded.149 The burden would thus be on the employer to limit its
review of recorded materials to those that it knows to be nonprivileged;
then, the employer should seek outside legal advice or place the
communications before a court to decide whether they are in fact
These two arguments—that lawyers should prevent
privileged.150
monitored communications and that employers should prevent themselves
from reading attorney-client communications—are not mutually exclusive.
Part I of this Note has focused on the history and elements of attorneyclient privilege, its confidentiality requirement, and employer monitoring of
employee communications. To summarize, past scholarship has argued that
lawyers or employers should prevent monitored attorney-client
communications from occurring or becoming nonprivileged. But given that
attorney-client communications are monitored, courts must determine when
the privilege should attach to a communication notwithstanding that the
employer monitored the employee’s communication. Part II analyzes three
different approaches that courts have used or commentators have proposed
146. See id. at 3–4.
147. See id. at 4 n.7. For an example of a state that has endorsed and adopted the ABA’s
approach, see Mark M. Iba, Warning: This Email May Be Monitored or Recorded, 81 J.
KAN. B. ASS’N, March 2012, at 11.
148. Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Company-Issued Equipment and Waivers of Privilege, ALICLE, 273 (Oct. 17, 2011), http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf
/VCT1017_chapter_09_thumb.pdf (“Therefore, you should NEVER communicate by e-mail
with your attorney using a company-owned computer or other company-owned electronic
device or using your business e-mail address . . . . Client should provide Firm with an email
address, other than employer’s, for communication between the Firm and Client.”).
149. See Marjorie J. Peerce & Daniel V. Shapiro, The Increasing Privacy Expectations in
Employees’ Personal Email, 13 J. INTERNET L., no. 8, 2010, at 1; John K. Villa, Emails
Between Employees and Their Attorneys Using Company Computers: Are They Still
Privileged?, ACC DOCKET, Apr. 2008, available at http://www.wc.com/assets/attachments
/EP_(5).pdf.
150. See Peerce & Shapiro, supra note 149, at 20 (“[A]n employer is on safer ground
when it remains within the boundaries of traditionally accepted practice and limits its review
to non-privileged material accessible in the memory of the company’s computers when its
electronic communications policy provides authorization for such action. Even if a company
has a novel electronic communications policy that explicitly allows for the use of login
information or review of attorney-client communications, it should seek outside legal advice
before acting in the present climate of uncertainty.”); Villa, supra note 149, at 104 (“[O]ne
option is to hold onto the emails, not read them, and place the issue before the court for
decision.”).
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to determine whether attorney-client privilege should attach to an employermonitored communication.
II. COURTS’ AND COMMENTATORS’ APPROACHES TO WHETHER
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD ATTACH TO COMMUNICATIONS
MONITORED BY THE CLIENT’S EMPLOYER
Courts have consistently held that an employer can override an
employee’s expectation of privacy or confidentiality by instituting a policy
that e-communications are monitored by the employer.151 However, courts
and commentators have diverged in their analyses as to whether clients
retain or lose attorney-client privilege by communicating with their
attorneys while being monitored by their employer. Part II categorizes the
approaches in three sections: in the first approach, the communication is
privileged only if the employee’s expectation of confidentiality is
objectively reasonable; in the second approach, the attorney-client
communication is never privileged because the employer monitoring
destroys confidentiality; and in the third approach, the attorney-client
communication is privileged because confidentiality is not required for the
privilege.152
A. Approach One: The Objective Reasonableness of the Employee’s
Expectation of Confidentiality Dictates Whether the Monitored
Communication Is Privileged
The first approach that courts use to determine whether an employermonitored communication is privileged is the test derived from the Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy analysis.153 The court in In re Asia
Global Crossing took stock of judicial decisions that discussed the
reasonableness of employees’ expectation of privacy154 and produced a
four-factor test:
(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning personal or other
objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of the
employee’s computer or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a right of access
151. See Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Glenayre had
announced that it could inspect the laptops that it furnished for the use of its employees, and
this destroyed any reasonable expectation of privacy that Muick might have had . . . .”);
United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[E-mail monitoring] policy
placed employees on notice that they could not reasonably expect that their Internet activity
would be private.”); In re Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig., 275 F.R.D. 154, 163
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[B]ecause RMCI’s email policy bans personal use of the RMCI email
system, this factor weighs in favor of finding that [the defendant] had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the emails he sent to his wife over that system . . . .”).
152. Courts sometimes use the word “privacy” interchangeably with “confidentiality.”
This section adheres to each court’s language.
153. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
154. The court drew upon the analysis of five previous decisions that had found no
reasonable expectation of privacy and three previous decisions that had found a reasonable
expectation of privacy across both state and federal courts. See In re Asia Global Crossing,
Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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to the computer or e-mails, and (4) did the corporation notify the
employee, or was the employee aware, of the use and monitoring
policies?155

If the answer to some or all of these questions is affirmative, then courts
may find that the employer effectively diminished its employees’
expectation of privacy—and as a result, there can be no attorney-client
privilege because the confidentiality requirement has not been met.156 This
subpart examines cases in which courts held the employee had an
objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality, and then analyzes
cases in which courts held that the employee did not have an objectively
reasonable expectation of confidentiality.
1. Courts Finding the Privilege Intact Because the Employees Had an
Objectively Reasonable Expectation of Confidentiality
A noninsignificant number of courts have concluded that employers’
electronic monitoring policies did not destroy the attorney-client privilege.
The case that created the objective reasonableness test, Asia Global
Crossing, is one example where the attorney-client privilege remained
intact.157 Before outlining the four factors, the court established two
assumptions: first, the court assumed that the employees’ emails would be
otherwise privileged if not for an unreasonable expectation of privacy, and
relatedly, the court assumed that the employees subjectively intended the
communications to be confidential.158 Turning to its four-factor test, the
court first determined that the corporation did maintain a policy banning
personal use.159 Second, the court could not explicitly determine that the
employer actually monitored emails.160 Third, the court determined that the
company or anyone with access to the company’s email system had access
to the employee emails because they were sent and stored on the company’s
servers.161 Fourth, the court found no convincing evidence that the

155. See id.
156. See supra Part I.A.2.c.
157. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
158. In re Asia Global Crossing, 322 B.R. at 258. (“[T]he Court assumes that the Insider
E-mails are otherwise privileged, and further, that the Insiders subjectively intended that they
be confidential.”).
159. Id. at 260 (“Privacy of these messaging systems is not guaranteed, nor implied. It is
the responsibility of every authorized user to be aware of, and comply with, all corporate
policy and guidelines while using messaging systems. All data and content on these
messaging systems is the property of the Company. No content on these messaging systems
shall be withheld from the Company’s authorized security personnel or others specifically
authorized by the chief executive officer of the Company.” (emphasis in original)). The
court noted that sending a message over the company’s email system was “like placing a
copy of that message in the company files.” Id. at 259.
160. See id. at 260. Each of the Insiders submitted statements that the company did not
monitor employee emails. Id.
161. Id. at 259 (“Asia Global clearly had access to its own servers and any other part of
the system where e-mail messages were stored . . . .”).
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employer had warned the employees of its email policy.162 Taking these
four factors together, the court called the evidence “equivocal” and held that
it was “unable to conclude as a matter of law that the [employees’] use of
Asia Global’s e-mail system to communicate with their personal attorney
eliminated any otherwise existing attorney-client privilege.”163 In short, the
court paired an initial assumption of the privilege with a novel four-factor
expectation of confidentiality test, and held that merely communicating on a
monitored work email did not destroy attorney-client privilege.164
In a case decided concurrently with Asia Global Crossing, a California
state appellate court found that documents prepared for an attorney in a
password-protected folder on an employer-issued laptop were protected by
attorney-client privilege because the employee’s expectation of
confidentiality was objectively reasonable.165 In preparation for a rape trial,
the prosecutor seized the defendant’s employer-issued laptop and collected
all correspondence authored by the defendant pursuant to a subpoena.166
When the prosecutor found fourteen files in a password-protected folder
marked “Attorney,” the prosecutor sought and received the password from
the employer.167 The prosecutor argued that the files left on the laptop with
a password known only by the defendant and his wife were “left in,
basically, a public area . . . [and] cannot be privileged.”168 The trial court
agreed and held that the documents were not privileged.169
By stating at the outset that there is a presumption of the privilege,170 the
appellate court began its analysis in a manner similar to Asia Global
Crossing.171 The court then cited three factors that convinced the court that
162. See id. (noting that employees asserted that no policy on use and monitoring was
enacted or enforced).
163. Id. at 261.
164. See id. at 261–62.
165. People v. Jiang, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 184, 207–08 (Ct. App. 2005).
166. See id. at 198 (noting that the prosecutor sought an English language document for
the purported purpose of obtaining evidence of the defendant’s ability to communicate in
English).
167. Id. at 201 (“When [the employer] supplied the prosecutor with the password, [the
employer’s] attorney believed that the documents would only be released by court order if
they were found not to be privileged.”).
168. Id. The prosecutor pointed to the defendant’s company policy, signed by employees,
which waived the employee’s expectation of privacy: “I understand that I have no
expectation of privacy in the voicemail and electronic mail provided to me by the Company
or in any property situated on the Company’s premises and/or owned by the Company,
including disks and other storage media, filing cabinets or other work areas. I further
understand that such property, including voice mail and electronic mail, is subject to
inspection by Company personnel at any time.” Id. at 197–98.
169. Id. at 201 (quoting the trial court’s decision, which concluded that “the court
concludes that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in said
documents, any privileges that existed were waived by the defendant’s own conduct”).
170. See id. at 203 (“[T]he communication is presumed to have been made in confidence
and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the
communication was not confidential.” (citation omitted)).
171. See In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“[T]he Court assumes that the Insider E-mails are otherwise privileged, and further, that the
Insiders subjectively intended that they be confidential.”).
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the employee had an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality in
the files: First, the employment agreement did not suggest that the
employer would access files that were “clearly segregated as personal and
password-protected.”172 Second, the purpose of the employer’s policy was
not to invade the privacy of its employees, but rather to protect the
employer’s intellectual property.173 Third, the defendant did not waive the
privilege because the defendant could have believed that he had reserved a
claim of privilege.174 Thus, the California state court used an analysis that
paralleled the Asia Global Crossing test in that it considered the nature and
circumstances of the employer’s written monitoring policy; but the
California court went further in considering the purpose of the policy.175
The courts reached similar conclusions between technically nonconfidential
emails and technically nonconfidential documents, holding that each
employee’s expectation of confidentiality was reasonable in spite of an
employer’s ability to monitor such emails and files.176
The Eastern District of New York reached a similar conclusion in Curto
v. Medical World Communications, Inc., where the plaintiff was the former
employee and the defendant was the former employer.177 The employer
had an “Email/Computer Privacy Policy” that the employee had signed,
stating that “[e]mployees should not have an expectation of privacy in
anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.”178
The employee, who had worked on company-owned computers at home,
had deleted personal files prior to returning the computers.179 However, the
former employer hired a forensic consultant that restored portions of the
files and emails, including documents that the plaintiff’s attorney contended
were covered by attorney-client privilege.180 The magistrate judge had held
that the plaintiff did not waive her attorney-client privilege because the
defendant had never enforced its computer usage policy.181 Noting that the
Asia Global Crossing test recognizes enforcement as a factor to consider,
the court concluded that the magistrate judge’s finding of a reasonable
172. Jiang, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 205.
173. See id. at 205.
174. See id. at 207 (“[A] reasonable layperson could have understood the court’s
statement to reserve any claim of privilege for later resolution. Therefore, the prosecutor
failed to prove that the defendant waived his privilege as to the information in these
documents.”).
175. See id. at 205 (stating that the purpose was not designed “to invade the privacy of its
employees”).
176. See id. at 208; supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
177. No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *5–7 (E.D.N.Y. May 15,
2006).
178. Id. at *2.
179. See id.
180. See id. at *1 (“(1) a draft memorandum from Plaintiff to John J. Hennessy, MWC’s
Chief Executive Officer, prepared by Plaintiff and her counsel; (2) a ‘chronology of events’
describing events underlying many of Plaintiff’s claims, prepared by Plaintiff and her
counsel; (3) drafts of Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint prepared by Plaintiff and her counsel; and
(4) various e-mails sent amongst Plaintiff and her counsel.”).
181. See id. at *3.
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expectation of privacy was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.182
Without more evidence of actual monitoring, the court found that the
employee’s expectation of privacy allowed the attorney-client privilege to
attach to the communications.183
At least one court has held that the privilege attaches even without a
reasonable expectation of privacy. In Sims v. Lakeside School, the
defendant school brought a motion to compel review of a former
employee’s laptop hard drive that had been furnished by the defendant
school.184 The Western District of Washington held that the former
employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy because the employee
signed a policy that limits the use of the laptop to academic and
administrative purposes and states that “user accounts are the property of
Lakeside Schools.”185 In spite of the employer’s policy, the court held that
any material created to communicate with his attorney would be protected
under attorney-client privilege.186 The court stated that “public policy”
dictated that these materials be protected, implying that the court’s
overriding consideration was the purpose of the privilege—to promote
candid communications between clients and their attorneys.187
The D.C. District Court found in Convertino v. U.S. Department of
Justice that an employee’s expectation of confidentiality in monitored
emails was objectively reasonable.188 The plaintiff, an Assistant U.S.
Attorney, had been the lead trial counsel in a case under investigation by the
Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Office of Professional Responsibility.189
One of the investigators retained private counsel and used his DOJ email
address to communicate with the private counsel.190 During the course of
the investigation, an article discussing the investigation was published in
the Detroit Free Press and the plaintiff, who had been the subject of the
investigation, sued the DOJ for leaking information in violation of the
Privacy Act.191
The plaintiff moved to compel discovery of the DOJ investigator’s
emails that were sent from his DOJ account to his personal attorney.192 The

182. See id. at *8. Interestingly, the Curto court held that cases considering the
expectation of privacy in the workplace are not dispositive of the issue of expectation of
confidentiality, but then used Asia Global Crossing’s four-factor test to determine the
expectation of confidentiality (a test which that court had derived from expectation of
privacy cases). See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
183. See Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *8–9.
184. No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20, 2007).
185. Id.
186. See id. at *2.
187. See id. (“Notwithstanding defendant Lakeside’s policy in its employee manual,
public policy dictates that such communications shall be protected to preserve the sanctity of
communications made in confidence.”).
188. 674 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C. 2009).
189. See id. at 100.
190. See id. at 108.
191. See id. at 100.
192. See id.
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court cited Asia Global Crossing’s four-factor test and concluded that,
despite the DOJ’s policy of monitoring personal emails, the employee’s
expectation of privacy was reasonable.193 The court overlooked that the
DOJ had a policy of accessing personal emails, but instead focused on the
fourth factor of the Asia Global Crossing test: the DOJ employee stated
that he was “unaware that they would be regularly accessing and saving email sent from his account.”194 Because of this lack of awareness, the
employee’s expectation of privacy was held to be reasonable, and the court
allowed the privilege to protect the employee’s emails.195
For one final example of a court finding an objectively reasonable
expectation of confidentiality in electronic communications despite an
employer’s monitoring policy, consider United States v. Nagle.196 In this
case, a client prepared a chronology of events at the request of his attorney
in anticipation of criminal charges and stored the file on a laptop.197 After
the employer fired him, he was not allowed to retrieve files from the laptop,
but another employee retrieved the file and emailed it to a different
employee who was also facing criminal charges.198 The document was then
turned over by that employee’s attorney to the government in discovery,
which led the defendant’s attorney to assert that attorney-client privilege
protected the document.199
In finding that the client’s expectation of confidentiality in a file stored
on his work laptop was objectively reasonable, the Middle District of
Pennsylvania drew upon two of the factors from Asia Global Crossing:
first, the client’s company had no policy explicitly banning the use of work
computers for personal reasons (it simply stated that “email activity is NOT
private”); second, there was no evidence that the client’s company had ever
monitored its employees’ use of the computers or email.200 Thus the court
concluded that the defendant employee had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy and therefore the document was protected by
attorney-client privilege.201
In addition to the previous six examples, other courts have found an
employee’s expectation of confidentiality to be objectively reasonable
under still different circumstances.202 Though each of the courts reached
the same conclusion based on the same test, each court’s analysis was
distinct. For example, none of the courts explicitly stated the two
underlying assumptions that the Asia Global Crossing court stated at the
193. See id. at 110.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. No. 1:09-CR-384, 2010 WL 3896200 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010).
197. See id. at *1.
198. See id. at *2.
199. See id. at *3.
200. Id. at *3–4.
201. See id. at *3.
202. See, e.g., Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 255 F.R.D. 98, 108
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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outset of its analysis.203 Moreover, each of the courts found different
factors to be dispositive: in Curto, it was the lack of evidence of actual
monitoring; in Convertino, it was the employee’s lack of awareness that his
employer monitored him; in Nagle, the court seemed to require that the
policy explicitly ban personal use instead of simply stating that emails were
not private; and in Sims, public policy concerns were enough to override the
lack of an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.204
2. Courts Finding the Employee Waived the Privilege Because the
Employee Did Not Have an Objectively Reasonable Expectation of
Confidentiality
In contrast to the above cases, some courts have held that attorney-client
privilege was implicitly waived by an employee’s use of an employer’s
computer with a monitoring policy. These cases are similar to those
analyzed in the previous subpart: like those cases, the courts use an
expectation of confidentiality test to determine the reasonableness of the
employee’s expectation. Whereas those cases held that the employee’s
expectation of confidentiality was reasonable, the following cases conclude
that the communications are not privileged because the employee could not
have had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.
In Hanson v. First National Bank, an employee’s personal attorney
objected to the disclosure of emails sent on the bank’s system in preparation
for criminal proceedings based on attorney-client privilege.205 The
handbook of the bank stated that it “maintain[ed] the right and the ability to
enter any [voicemail and electronic mail] systems and to inspect and review
any and all data recorded on those systems.”206 The court used Asia Global
Crossing’s test and found that the employer’s reservation of the right to
inspect was sufficient to make employees’ expectation of privacy
unreasonable; thus the employee had “effectively waived the attorney-client
privilege” in using the bank’s computing system in communicating with his
criminal attorney.207
More recently, the Southern District of Texas reached a similar holding
in a bankruptcy proceeding in In re Royce Homes LP.208 The bankruptcy
trustee moved to compel production of documents from the debtor’s owner

203. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
204. The discrepancies in how the objective reasonableness test is applied—even within
courts reaching the same conclusion—tends to support the idea that the courts are simply
making an outcome determinative calculation that the privilege is too important to be
trumped by an employer monitoring policy. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 6.8 (“[C]ourts may
simply conclude that the importance of attorney-client communications is sufficiently great
to preclude employers from knowingly violating them, regardless of announced policies.”).
205. No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011).
206. Id. at *2.
207. Id. at *6.
208. 449 B.R. 709, 732–33 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), appeal dismissed, 466 B.R. 81 (S.D.
Tex. 2012).
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after the owner asserted attorney-client privilege.209 The documents had
been sent and received via the debtor’s computer system, which was
covered by a policy that allowed monitoring of the communications at any
time.210 The court adopted Asia Global Crossing’s four-factor test and
found that the employee waived attorney-client privilege by communicating
on a system covered by the employer’s policy.211 The court noted that the
debtor had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to show either that he was
unaware of the policy or that the policy was unenforced.212
The Western District of Oklahoma recently compelled production of
attorney-client communications based on the employer’s policy that it
retained the right to monitor emails.213 The company reported that it did
not manage personal email and did not review the contents of the
employee’s emails, but the court nonetheless found that the policy alone
caused the employee to waive any attorney-client privilege he may have
had.214
The Western District of Washington similarly found that two former
employees had waived attorney-client privilege by leaving communications
with their attorneys saved on laptops that they later returned to their former
employer.215 The attorney-client communications had been created prior to
their employment, but while employed, they stored the files on the
company’s laptops.216 The company had a far-reaching monitoring policy
that applied to “[a]ll resources used for electronic communications,”
including those stored on the company’s systems.217 Despite the former
employees’ claims that they were unaware of the policy, the court

209. See id.
210. See id. at 733.
211. See id. at 733–38 (“Accordingly, the Court finds that [the client] waived the
attorney-client privilege as to any e-mails he sent and received via the [employer’s]
computer system, as any communications between [the client] and his personal counsel were
not confidential . . . . After applying Asia Global and its progeny, the evidence in this
dispute strongly tips in the Trustee’s favor.”).
212. See id. at 733 n.14.
213. See Chechele v. Ward, No. Civ-10-1286-M, 2012 WL 4481439, at *1 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 28, 2012) (The company policy stated, “SandRidge reserves the right to examine,
monitor, and regulate e-mail messages, directories and files, as well as any Internet usage
. . . .”).
214. See id. at *2.
215. See Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1084 (W.D. Wash.
2011).
216. See id. at 1092–93.
217. Id. at 1093 (noting that the employer policy stated in part, “KLC reserves the right to
access, search, inspect, monitor, record, and disclose any file or stored communication, with
or without notice to the employee, at any time for any reason to ensure that such
communications are being used for legitimate business reasons. Deleted e-mail messages
may also be restored from the system.”). Because of this policy, the court held that the
plaintiffs waived any privilege that might have been applicable, and determined that the
waiver should encompass all of the materials from any source that were on the company
laptops. See id. at 1108–09.
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concluded that they had waived any privilege.218 In reaching this holding,
the court used the four-factor analysis from Asia Global Crossing, and
declined to adopt what it deemed the “no-waiver rule” for webmail, finding
that the waiver’s scope covers anything on the former employee’s
company-issued laptops.219
In a similar fashion, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a client’s
message to his attorney written on an employer-monitored computer was
not protected by the privilege due to waiver.220 The company’s employee
handbook prohibited personal use of its computers.221 One of the
company’s employees planned to quit and start a competing business and
prepared a memorandum for his attorney on the company’s computer
summarizing the industry and his planned resignation.222 The former
employee deleted the document from the computer, but a forensic expert
retrieved the document.223 The Virginia Supreme Court held that the
attorney-client privilege was waived because the employee handbook stated
that there was no expectation of privacy regarding the company’s
computers.224 The court analogized the former employee’s communication
to circumstances where a third party can overhear what is said.225
Similar to the wide divergence in how courts determined that an
employee held an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality in
Part II.A.1, courts finding objectively unreasonable expectations of
confidentiality also widely diverge in their analyses. In Hanson, the court
seemed to find an unreasonable expectation of confidentiality because of
the pervasiveness of the monitoring policy’s language; in Royce Holmes,
the court found that the evidence was equivocal that the employee was
unaware of the policy or that the policy was unenforced (which was
dispositive in reaching the opposite conclusion in Asia Global Crossing226);
in Chechele, the court explicitly overlooked that the employer did not
actually monitor to find that the employer’s policy alone caused privilege
waiver (which was dispositive in reaching the opposite holding in
Curto227); in Aventa, the court dismissed the employees’ claims that they
were unaware of the policy (which was dispositive of finding the

218. See id. at 1106 (“Such waiver would encompass all of the materials he placed or
saved from any source onto his KCDL laptop computer. His belated attempt to assert the
attorney-client privilege approximately a year and a half later is futile.”).
219. Id. at 1109–10.
220. See Banks v. Mario Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687, 695–96 (Va. 2007).
221. See id. at 690 (“[The e]mployee handbook prohibited: the unauthorized removal of
files from the computer and information systems, removing or copying Mario’s documents,
removing company property, and personal use of Mario’s computer and information systems
that was detrimental to Mario.”).
222. See id. at 691.
223. See id. at 695.
224. See id. at 695–96.
225. See id.
226. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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communication privileged in Convertino228) to hold that the communication
was not privileged; in Banks, the court found that the employee handbook
policy that computer usage was not private was dispositive in finding the
communication not privileged (but with nearly identical employee
handbook language in Nagle, the court there found the communication to be
privileged229).
In short, courts apply the objective reasonableness test from Asia Global
Crossing in vastly different ways. Because each court has chosen what
factual circumstances are dispositive, courts hold that attorney-client
communications are privileged in some instances and nonprivileged other
instances—even when faced with remarkably similar factual circumstances.
As a result, the case law on the objective reasonableness of an employee’s
expectation of confidentiality is neither consistent nor predictable.
B. Approach Two: The Privilege Does Not Attach Because the Employer
Monitoring Makes the Communication Nonconfidential
While the vast majority of courts use the objective reasonableness test,230
other courts do not reach the expectation of confidentiality analysis because
they take a formalistic approach and focus on the lack of confidentiality.
In Long v. Marubeni America Corp., the defendant, plaintiffs’ former
employer, moved to compel disclosure of twenty-five emails between the
plaintiffs and their private attorney.231 The plaintiffs had sent the emails on
company-issued computers but had used private, password-protected email
accounts.232 The defendant’s employee handbook, which one of the
plaintiffs had helped to prepare, stated that “use of the systems for personal
purposes are (sic) prohibited” and advised that the company retained the
right to monitor any matter “‘stored in, created, received, or sent over the e-

228. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
230. In addition to the cases highlighted in Part II.A.2, see United States v. Angevine, 281
F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the computer due to a flashed on-screen warning); United States v. Simons, 206
F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employee had no reasonable expectation of
privacy because of the employer’s computer use policy); United States v. Bailey, 272 F.
Supp. 2d 822 (D. Neb. 2003) (holding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his work computer because of a flash-screen warning every time he used the
computer); McClaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015, at *4–5
(Tex. Ct. App. May 28, 1999) (finding that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of a private password-protected email sent from his
work computer); United States v. Monroe, 50 M.J. 550, 558 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999)
(finding that the defendant had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the email
system maintained by the government because that system was “for official business only”
and notice was given that the “system was subject to monitoring”); see also Bohach v. City
of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 123435 (D. Nev. 1996); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp.
97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
231. No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006).
232. See id.
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mail, voice mail, word processing, and/or internet systems provided’ by [the
defendant].”233
The Southern District of New York first found that ten of the twenty-five
emails were not covered by the privilege because they were not
communications between a client and an attorney for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice.234 The court then held that the remaining fifteen
emails were not privileged because “the Court is convinced that [the
plaintiffs] knew or should have known of [the employee handbook
policy].”235 Because one of the plaintiffs had helped prepare the employee
handbook, and because the company sent annual reminders about its policy,
the court found that the employees must have voluntarily disregarded the
email monitoring policy.236 The court expressly refused to apply the
inadvertent disclosure doctrine, finding that the plaintiffs would have had to
accidentally send the emails to be able to claim inadvertent disclosure—but
because the plaintiffs had voluntarily sent the emails to their attorneys, the
emails were not confidential in fact, and thus the attorney-client privilege
could not attach.237 In other words, the emails lacked confidentiality at the
outset, and thus were immediately ineligible for attorney-client privilege.
Similarly, the court in Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center found that
monitoring
of
attorney-client
communications
rendered
the
communications nonconfidential and thus were nonprivileged.238 In
preparation for a dispute between the hospital and a doctor, the doctor
corresponded with his private attorney on the hospital’s email system.239
The hospital’s counsel sent a letter to the doctor’s attorney informing him
of the hospital’s possession of attorney-client emails and stating that any
potential privilege had been waived by the doctor by using the hospital’s
email system.240 The doctor then filed a motion for a protective order
seeking return of the emails.241 The court denied the protective order,
finding that the employer’s handbook policy had the same effect as having
the employer looking over the doctor’s shoulder as he sent the email.242
The court distinguished cases that upheld the privilege based on the fact

233. Id. (alteration in original).
234. See id. at *3.
235. Id.
236. See id. (“[P]laintiffs disregarded the admonishment voluntarily and, as a
consequence, have stripped from the e-mail messages referenced above the confidential
cloak with which they claim those communications were covered.”).
237. Id. at *3–4.
238. 847 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
239. See id. at 438.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 440 (“In other words, the otherwise privileged communication between
[the plaintiff] and [his attorney] would not have been made in confidence because of the
[employer] policy.”).
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that the hospital’s email policy banned all personal use—not just certain
personal uses.243
Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co. is a third example of a court
holding that email monitoring precluded attorney-client privilege because of
the confidentiality requirement.244 A former employee brought an action
for sexual harassment and moved for the employer to return emails
communicated between her and her attorney from her work computer.245
Unable to reach an agreement about the privileged status of the emails, the
parties entered into a stipulated protective order where the defendant would
not use any documents without first giving the plaintiff forty-five days’
written notice.246 However, the defendant then substituted counsel, and the
new counsel used the emails in support of the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment without giving notice.247 The appellate court affirmed
that the emails were not protected by the attorney-client privilege “because
they were not private.”248 The court emphasized that not only did the
company ban computer use for personal matters but the plaintiff also had
been advised that her email communications were accessible by her alleged
harasser.249 The court did not cite or use Asia Global Crossing’s four-part
test and rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the company never actually
accessed or audited employee’s computers.250 The court called it
“immaterial” that the “operational reality” was that the company did not
actually monitor the employees’ communications.251
In Long, Scott, and Holmes, the courts found that the employees’
communications with their attorneys were not privileged because the
communications had been monitored by the employers and thus lacked
243. See id. at 441. Though the court concluded that the communications were not
confidential, and thus not privileged, the court also analyzed whether the client’s expectation
of confidentiality was reasonable under the four factors of the Asia Global Crossing test and
concluded that three of the factors made the expectation of confidentiality unreasonable.
The third factor was irrelevant, but the others led the court to conclude that the expectation
of confidentiality was unreasonable. See id. at 443. Despite analyzing the objective
reasonableness of the employee’s expectation of confidentiality, the court emphasized that
the communications were not confidential in fact. See id. at 442–44.
244. 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878 (Ct. App. 2011).
245. See id. at 893.
246. See id. at 894 (“The letter noted, however, that ‘by entering into the protective order,
neither side is waiving any arguments it may have regarding the appropriate use of the [emails].’” (alteration in original)).
247. See id.
248. Id. at 895.
249. See id. at 896 (“This is akin to consulting her attorney in one of defendants’
conference rooms, in a loud voice, with the door open, yet unreasonably expecting that the
conversation overheard by [her supervisor] would be privileged.”).
250. See id. at 897.
Whether an employer actually monitors an employee’s
communications is one factor of Asia Global Crossing’s four-part test. See supra notes 8–10
and accompanying text.
251. Holmes, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 898 (“Absent a company communication to employees
explicitly contradicting the company’s warning to them that company computers are
monitored to make sure employees are not using them to send personal e-mail, it is
immaterial that the ‘operational reality’ is the company does not actually do so.”).
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confidentiality. Each of the courts used a more formalistic approach than
the courts in Part II.A.
Instead of using the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the employee’s expectation of confidentiality as
justification to reach their holdings, they emphasized that the
communications were not confidential in fact.
C. Approach Three: Professor Rice’s View—All Attorney-Client
Communications Are Privileged Notwithstanding Employer Monitoring
Because Confidentiality Should Not Be Required
As outlined in Part I.B.3, Professor Paul Rice argues that confidentiality
has no place in attorney-client privilege doctrine.252 Though he never
argued for the abolition of the confidentiality requirement specifically in the
context of employer-monitored communications,253 Professor Rice has
argued that the privilege should attach to any communication between a
lawyer and a client, regardless of whether a third party is present. This
presumably includes an employer who electronically monitors
employees.254
III. A FOURTH APPROACH: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD
ATTACH IF THE EMPLOYEE BELIEVED THE COMMUNICATION WAS
CONFIDENTIAL NOTWITHSTANDING THE EMPLOYER’S MONITORING
Part III proposes a fourth approach for analyzing whether the privilege
should attach to an employer-monitored attorney-client communication.
While courts should adopt previous scholars’ proposals that attorneys or
employers should limit attorney-client communications from being read by
a third party,255 once an employer accesses an otherwise privileged
communication, Part III argues that courts should consider only the
subjective intent of the employee to keep her attorney communication
confidential.
The Supreme Court has stated that
the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.256

Just as the Supreme Court values the public policy underlying the
privilege,257 the Court also seeks to promote certainty and predictability in
determining whether a communication is privileged. Part II of this Note
outlined the divergence in courts’ approaches as to whether attorney-client
privilege attaches to employer-monitored communications between
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See supra Part I.B.3.
See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 6.8.
See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of Professor Rice’s argument.
See supra Part I.D.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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attorneys and their clients.258 Given the wide divergence in the case law,
there is an evident need for a test that satisfies the Court’s call for certainty
and predictability in attorney-client privilege doctrine. This section first
addresses the benefits and limitations of the first three approaches before
advocating for a new approach—the subjective belief test.
A. The Benefits and Limitations of the Three Approaches
This section discusses the benefits and limitations of each of the three
approaches described in Part II: first, the objective reasonableness test;
second, the automatically nonprivileged approach; and third, the
automatically privileged approach.259
The majority of courts faced with the issue of whether the privilege
should attach to an employer-monitored electronic communication consider
whether the employee had an objectively reasonable expectation of
confidentiality in that communication.260 Courts generally have used
similar analyses (derived from Asia Global Crossing’s four-part test), and
this approach has the benefit of giving courts the flexibility to delve into
fact-specific circumstances to weigh the factors that tend to make an
employee’s expectation of confidentiality in his or her communication
reasonable or unreasonable. When there are some facts in the record that
make the employee’s belief seem reasonable and some facts that make it
seem unreasonable, this approach allows a court to balance the goal of
truth-seeking against the goals of attorney-client privilege.261
However, the objective reasonableness approach has many limitations.
First, as the divergent case law illustrates, courts that apply the test to
similar factual situations veer apart in their conclusions regarding whether
an employee’s belief in the confidentiality of his or her communication was
reasonable.262 This test therefore fails to meet the Supreme Court’s
mandate that the privilege doctrine should be consistent and predictable so
that attorneys and clients can anticipate in advance whether a
communication will be privileged.263 In turn, this could lead clients to be
unsure of whether their expectation of confidentiality is reasonable and
258. This divergence in analyses lead to disparate holdings in the face of remarkably
similar fact patterns. See supra Part II; see also Adam C. Losey, Clicking Away
Confidentiality: Workplace Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1202
(2008) (“Some courts have adopted a modern approach to attorney-client privilege in
workplace waiver cases. These courts have broadly interpreted the privilege in an attempt to
deal with situations where these courts feel the privilege should be upheld. They may do so
either for public policy reasons, or because they feel that the traditional approach is unable to
cope with issues involving technology. Other courts have adhered to Wigmore’s traditional
approach. While it is possible that courts adopting the modern, broad approach have done so
unwittingly, the difference of breadth has naturally led to inconsistent holdings and will
continue to do so until some uniformity is established.”).
259. See supra Part II.
260. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
262. Compare supra Part II.A.1, with supra Part II.A.2.
263. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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could cause a chilling effect on client candor. Because this approach
decreases clients’ propensity to speak candidly with their attorneys, it
undermines the public policy justification of the privilege.264
Second, the objective reasonableness approach may also be difficult to
justify doctrinally because it is derived from the Fourth Amendment
expectation of privacy test.265 For example, at least one circuit court has
held that the Fourth Amendment’s expectation of privacy analysis is
distinct from and should not be confounded with the attorney-client
privilege analysis.266 Third, the objective reasonableness test requires
attorneys to expend resources to determine whether their clients’
employers’ monitoring policies prohibit private communications. Fourth,
courts must also expend resources to conduct complex, fact-specific
inquiries to determine whether the client’s belief in confidentiality was
reasonable.
The second approach—that monitored communications are, by
definition, not confidential and thus the privilege cannot attach—also has
benefits and limitations. First, it is beneficial because it serves as a brightline rule that is relatively easy for courts to apply. As long as an employer
has access to an employee’s communications, those communications cannot
be privileged. This approach has the additional benefits of promoting the
court’s truth-seeking function and promoting fairness for the client’s
adversary. The adversary only needs to show that a third party had access
to the communication to undermine the employee’s privilege claim.
Therefore, courts following this approach will invariably permit the
disclosure of more communications than under the first or third approaches,
providing more evidence to the adversary and the court.267
However, this second approach yields a serious drawback. Because
people generally believe that their emails are private,268 this approach
punishes clients who have a mistaken but honest beliefs that their emails are
confidential by stripping their communications of privilege protection. This
approach therefore creates a chilling effect that undermines the public
policy goal of the privilege. Because they are unable to understand
monitoring technology, prudent clients may refrain from communicating
with their attorneys due to the chance that some type of electronic
monitoring covers their communication—even if their email is strictly
confidential. In other words, this approach discourages clients from using
even safe channels of communication. Whereas the first approach chills
264. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
266. See United States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2006) (“It is true that, in the
Fourth Amendment context, the law affords considerably less recognition to an inmate’s
subjective expectation of privacy. An inmate does not, however, knowingly waive an
attorney-client privilege with respect to documents retained in her cell simply because there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in those documents for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Rather, the two inquiries are independent of each other.” (citation omitted)).
267. Compare supra Part II.A., and Part II.C., with Part II.B.
268. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
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client candor because it is unpredictable, this approach chills client candor
because it prevents communications over channels that a client merely
suspects may be monitored.
The third approach—that confidentiality should not be required so
employer monitoring has no effect on privilege—also has benefits and
limitations. No court has adopted this approach yet, but like the second
approach, it would serve as a bright-line rule that would be relatively easy
for courts to apply. A court would only need to consider whether the
communication was made between attorneys and clients for the purpose of
seeking or obtaining legal advice to determine the communication’s
privilege status.269 This approach would have the additional benefit of
encouraging client candor, though perhaps impermissibly so: it subverts the
idea that there is no need to protect communications about which the client
is willing to let others know.270 Abolishing the confidentiality requirement
would undermine a limiting function that serves the court’s truth-seeking
process because courts would lose otherwise-admissible evidence that the
client never intended to be confidential.271 In other words, a court may
refuse to admit valuable information to which the fact-finder would
otherwise be entitled because of the mere fact that the client had
communicated that information to his or her attorney. By limiting
potentially valuable evidentiary information, the third approach is the least
fair to the client’s adversary.
In sum, each of the three approaches has both benefits and limitations.
The final part of this Note argues that while attorneys and employers should
seek to avoid monitored communications from losing the privilege, once a
monitored communication has been intercepted and read, the client’s
subjective belief that the communication was confidential should govern
whether the communication is privileged.
B. The Client’s Subjective Belief That the Communication Remained
Confidential Should Govern Whether the Monitored Communication Is
Privileged
This part argues for a three-pronged approach. First, lawyers should seek
to prevent nonconfidential communications from occurring by discussing
how a lack of confidentiality in their clients’ workplace systems might
undermine attorney-client privilege.
Second, if attorney-client
communications have been monitored, employers should attempt to avoid
reading attorney-client communications so that, even though they were
technically nonconfidential, courts may still consider them privileged.
Third, courts should allow the privilege to attach when the employee
believed that her communications with her attorney were confidential.

269. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part I.B.2.
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First, courts should adopt elements of the ABA Formal Opinion and find
that lawyers have an ethical duty—and perhaps a constitutional duty in
criminal cases under the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective counsel—to
inform their clients of the risks of communicating via email.272 Prudent
lawyers should protect against the possibility that sensitive information will
be communicated in a way that is accessible to any third party.273
Similarly, courts or legislatures should adopt a rule that employers that
monitor employee communications must use a two-tiered recording system,
where the employer walls off recorded information until a lawyer or court
reviews them for nonprivileged materials.274
Taken together, these two strategies have a few benefits. First, they
avoid nonconfidential communications from occurring in the first place,
and when such conversations do occur, they prevent them from becoming
nonprivileged. Additionally, they encourage client literacy by requiring
lawyers to discuss electronic monitoring with their clients. In turn, these
strategies promote the privilege’s purpose of encouraging client candor in
situations where the client knows that the communication is strictly
confidential.275 Finally, these proposals reallocate the risk that the
communication is not privileged from the employee to either the lawyer or
employer. This risk reallocation protects the client because it allows the
court to hold either the client’s lawyer or employer culpable when an
attorney-client communication loses its privileged status.276
Once a monitored attorney-client communication has been read by an
employer, courts should consider only the subjective belief of the client that
the communication was confidential. Such a test is consistent with the
privilege doctrine because it is analogous to widely accepted exceptions to
confidentiality.277 Like those exceptions, this one would promote the
Supreme Court’s stated goals for attorney-client privilege.278 By relying
solely on subjective belief, this test serves the privilege’s purpose of
promoting client candor. A client will communicate openly because it is
272. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
276. If there were an ethical duty of lawyers to discuss the risks of monitored
communications with their clients or a rule that employers must wall off potentially
nonprivileged communications, then when lawyers or employers fail to take those
precautions, courts could find that the lawyer or employer is culpable and not the client;
thus, a court might find it would be illogical to punish the client for communicating on a
monitored communication and hold that the communication is privileged.
277. See supra Part I.B.1. One of the exceptions to confidentiality, inadvertent
disclosure, uses an objective test of reasonableness to determine whether the client took
reasonable precautions to maintain confidentiality. The justifications for using an objective
test for inadvertent disclosure are not applicable to the present issue because whether the
privilege should attach to a communication at the outset is distinct from whether the client
acted in such a way that maintained confidentiality. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J.
Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A Proposal For a
Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211 (2006).
278. See supra notes 18, 256 and accompanying text.
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the client’s understanding that dictates whether the privilege attaches.279
Additionally, the attorney and the client can accurately predict—even in
advance of any litigation—which communications will or will not be
privileged.280 Thus, similar to the widely accepted exceptions to strict
confidentiality,281 the subjective belief test mirrors the Supreme Court’s
goals of promoting client candor and yielding a consistent, predictable
privilege doctrine.
The subjective belief test is not only justifiable based on the expansion of
the confidentiality requirement’s exceptions, however; the test also yields
more benefits and fewer limitations than the other three approaches.282
First, the fact-finding required to determine what is an objectively
reasonable expectation not only yields disparate holdings283 but is also
burdensome for both attorneys and courts.284 A test that relies solely on the
client’s subjective belief that the communications were confidential would
not require courts or attorneys to inquire beyond the client’s beliefs. This
would save attorney and court resources and reduce litigation costs.285
Second, the bright-line rules of the second and third approaches are
overbroad in that they either impermissibly punish a client with an honest
yet unreasonable expectation of confidentiality in his communication, or
burden the court’s truth-seeking by privileging communications that the
client did not intend to be confidential.286 But the subjective belief test
strikes a balance between these extremes. It avoids punishing those clients
who had an honest belief in the confidentiality of their email, and it avoids
privileging communications that the client did not intend to be confidential.
Third, the subjective belief test is relatively easy for clients to understand
because it is based on their internal beliefs and not external factors such as
their employers’ monitoring policy or complex case law. The goal of
promoting the client’s understanding of when the privilege attaches should
not be underestimated, especially given the current empirical evidence
showing that clients do not understand the privilege.287 An easy-tounderstand privilege doctrine may have additional social policy benefits,

279. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Moreover, a test that relies solely on
subjective belief may increase candor by increasing the frequency of communications
between an attorney and client; the objectively reasonable test may prevent a prudent lawyer
and prudent client from communicating via email thereby hindering the frequency of their
communications.
280. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part I.B.1.
282. See supra Part III.A.
283. Compare supra Part II.A.1, with Part II.A.2.
284. See supra notes 114–19 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Part III.A.
287. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 383 (1989)
(finding that 42 percent of surveyed clients believed confidentiality was absolute, 25 percent
believed that confidentiality rules allowed more liberal disclosure, and 32.8 percent correctly
believed that lawyers must maintain confidentiality with certain exceptions).
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such as preventing clients from fearing or hating their lawyers or
employers.
Finally, the subjective belief approach allows for flexibility as new
monitoring technologies emerge. Part of the problem with the current case
law is that courts have reacted slowly to novel monitoring techniques, and
have attempted to graft traditional in-person confidentiality doctrines onto
an online context.288 But as monitoring techniques evolve, employees may
have an even harder time understanding or identifying when their
communications are monitored. Applying the privilege whenever the client
believes that his or her communication was confidential allows the privilege
to evolve along with advancements in monitoring technologies. Even
though an employee’s belief may be increasingly unreasonable given the
growing pervasiveness of employee monitoring, privilege doctrine should
reallocate the risk of nonconfidentiality and not punish those clients who
honestly believed that their communication was confidential.
However, this Note’s proposal of relying solely on the subjective intent
of the client is not without its own limitations. For one, the approach relies
on the internal beliefs of the client. Reliance on the internal mental
processes of one party creates an evidentiary problem—how can the client
prove his subjective belief or his adversary prove the opposite? For
example, consider a client who did not read the employee handbook before
signing the policy, and thus was unaware of the monitoring policy and
honestly believed his communications were confidential. A court may be
hesitant to apply the privilege to this employee’s communications because
such a holding may discourage future employees from reading their
employer policies in order to remain ignorant. As another example,
consider an employee who is aware of the monitoring policy, but holds an
honest but mistaken belief that it is not enforced. Under the proposed
subjective belief test, the client holds an honest belief that his
communications are confidential and thus the privilege should attach. But a
court may be reluctant to apply the privilege to this employee’s
communications because this could discourage future employees from
seeking out information about whether their employer’s enforce their
monitoring policies. Moreover, situations like these could lead to
protracted factual determinations as to whether the client actually held an

288. This Note has focused exclusively on the confidentiality requirement of attorneyclient privilege in the context of employer monitoring of employee communications. There
are a few reasons why the test for electronic communications should be different from inperson communications: (1) electronic communications are uniquely exposed to third party
monitoring in ways that traditional communications are not; (2) because of the rapid pace of
technology, people are more likely to have a reasonable but mistaken belief in confidentiality
while communicating electronically; and (3) there is comparatively little that a client could
do to show the reasonableness of his belief in the confidentiality of electronic
communications compared to in-person communications. Future scholarship should
consider the soundness of the objective reasonableness test in other contexts beyond
employer-monitoring of electronic communications.
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honest belief that her communication was confidential. This wastes judicial
resources and increases litigation costs.
An additional problem with the subjective intent approach is that it
undermines the court’s truth-seeking role. Sole reliance on subjective belief
potentially allows the client to override his adversary’s challenge to his
privilege assertion by simply stating that he believed the communication
was confidential. Relatedly, the subjective intent approach may lead some
clients to commit perjury. It allows clients to swear after-the-fact that they
believed that their communication was confidential, due to the lack of
evidence to the contrary.
To illustrate how the subjective belief test would alter a court’s privilege
determination—and in turn yield an outcome more in line with the
privilege’s public policy goals—consider a recent case from the Eastern
District of New York.289 An employee, who had never authorized his
attorney to communicate confidential materials through his work email,
received a list of his assets as his attorney was preparing his will.290 During
an unrelated investigation, the company found the email and discovered that
the employee had undisclosed ownership interests in companies owned by
his employer’s vendors.291 The employee “forwarded [the email] to a non[work] email account, deleted the email from [his] inbox and . . . instructed
[his attorney] to send confidential information only to another email address
[he] had previously given her and not to [his work] email address.”292 The
employee moved for an order precluding the government from introducing
the email at trial, and the court used the Asia Global Crossing objective
reasonableness test to hold that the former employee had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in any of the communications made through his
email account.293
Consider how this Note’s proposed three-pronged test would lead to a
different analysis.294 First, the court did not consider whether the
employee’s lawyer breached a duty by unilaterally sending a confidential
email to his client’s monitored email account. The employee contended
that he had never authorized the attorney to use that account for confidential
uses and that he had only used it for scheduling purposes.295 The first
prong of this Note’s test would reallocate the culpability for the
nonconfidential communication from the client to the attorney because the
employee passively, unwillingly received the email.296 Second, the court
289. United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CR-457(RRM)(RML), 2013 WL 619572
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013).
290. See id. at *1.
291. See id. at *2.
292. Id. at *1.
293. Id. at *11.
294. The court found an alternative ground (waiver) for finding the email nonprivileged;
the opinion discussed the alternative ground after determining that the employee did not
have an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality in his email. See id. at *13.
295. See id. at *12.
296. See id. at *1.
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continued the trend of reaching a privilege determination by emphasizing
one or two elements of the Asia Global Crossing test.297 For instance, the
court downplayed that the CEO used the email system for personal use and
that there was no evidence that the company had ever monitored email use
before.298 The third prong of this Note’s test would supplant this
unpredictable, candor-quashing test with a single question: Did the
employee subjectively believe his communications were confidential? In
United States v. Finazzo, the court may well have found that the deletion of
the email invalidated the defendant’s claim that he believed the
communication was confidential. In other words, why would the employee
have warned his attorney not to email him on his work account and then
have deleted the email if he subjectively believed it was confidential?
Skeptics who believe that a subjective test may be abused by post hoc
claims should note that the determination of subjective belief still relies on
a court’s finding that such a belief existed at the time of the communication.
In short, this Note’s three-pronged proposal may have led the court to reach
the same holding about the email’s privilege status; however, rather than
punish the client, this Note’s three-pronged approach would have led the
court to hold the attorney culpable. This approach will make the privilege
doctrine simpler, more predictable, and will better promote future client
candor.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers should seek to prevent nonconfidential communications from
occurring by discussing the risks of using an employer’s electronic systems
at the outset of representation. Additionally, employers should do their part
by refraining from reading potentially privileged communications until an
outside lawyer or court has reviewed them for privilege status. But even
with these precautions, employers will nevertheless monitor, record, and
read private attorney-client privileged communications. At this point, no
perfect solution exists for courts to determine whether attorney-client
privilege should attach—each approach has drawbacks and limitations.
However, just because no perfect solution exists does not mean that the
attorney-client privilege doctrine should not be improved. This Note has
argued that the attorney-client privilege should incorporate a new exception
to the confidentiality requirement: when an employer monitors an
employee’s communication, that communication is not strictly confidential,
but if the employee honestly believes that it was, the privilege should
attach. In short, the subjective intent approach proposed by this Note is the
297. See supra Part II.A.2. and accompanying text.
298. See Finazzo, 2013 WL 619572, at *9–10. The lack of actual monitoring was
determinative in finding an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality in previous
cases in the Eastern District of New York. See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, No. 06-CR0550(JS), 2009 WL 3806300, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009); Curto v. Medical World
Commc’ns, No. 03CV6327(DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *5–7 (E.D.N.Y. May 15,
2006).
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least-bad solution because it protects clients who have an honest but
unreasonable belief that their email is confidential. As a matter of public
policy, courts should refrain from using a test that results in limiting
attorney-client privilege to only smart, reasonable clients. Courts should
adopt a test that makes the privilege available to unsophisticated or
unreasonable, yet honest clients.
Future scholarship should consider the subjective belief approach in other
workplace modes of communication or other electronic communications
outside of the workplace setting. For instance, should a voicemail that a
lawyer leaves on an employee’s cellphone without knowing that the phone
was employer-owned be privileged? Or should a photocopy made by a
client on an employer-owned Xerox machine that automatically stores a
copy onto the machine’s hard drive be privileged? The subjective intent
approach may also have ramifications outside of the workplace context. If
an indigent client must use a public library’s or internet cafe’s computer to
send his attorney documents, does the library’s or internet cafe’s monitoring
policy render those materials nonprivileged?
As twenty-first century technologies pose new dilemmas in
confidentiality, courts should return to the underlying purpose of the
attorney-client privilege. This will ensure that the doctrine evolves and
continues to promote client candor and effective representation in a way
that is consistent and predictable for attorneys and clients alike.

